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Abstract
We revisit the issue of product line design by a monopolist and
extend the model of Mussa and Rosen (1978) in two ways. First, we
consider the case in which the unit cost is a nonconvex function of
product quality. We show that the firm does not offer those quali-
ties where the unit cost is linear or exceeds its lower convex envelope.
Consequently, there are "gaps" in its optimal quality choice. Sec-
ond, when the firm can offer only a limited number of quality levels
(due to possible fixed costs), we characterize the optimal location of
these finitely many quality levels. This characterization again has the
property that none of these qualities will lie within an interval where
the unit cost is linear or exceeds its lower convex envelope. Several
implications of the above results are discussed.
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1 Introduction
Consider a monopolist firm that provides a product at different quality levels.
Consumers differ in their willingness to pay for quality, but they all prefer a
product of a higher quality. In such a familiar context of vertical differentia-
tion, we extend the seminal Mussa and Rosen (1978) model in two directions.
First, the firm’s unit cost is a strictly convex function of quality in Mussa
and Rosen (1978) (and also the remaining literature on product line design).
A central task of the current paper is to relax this assumption and to exam-
ine the effects of non-convexity in the firm’s unit cost function on its price
discrimination and product choice. We show that the firm’s optimal price
policy is what it would be if the unit cost function were the lower convex
envelope of the firm’s true cost function. In particular, the firm will not sell
in those "anomalous" quality intervals where the unit cost function exceeds
its convex envelope. That is, its optimal quality choice contains "holes",
which contrasts with the standard conclusion that the firm’s quality choice is
a continuum (p. 310-311 of Mussa and Rosen 1978, Proposition 6 of Rochet
and Chone 1998).
Second, we also examine the firm’s quality location problem when it can
offer only a limited number of quality levels. Mainly for analytical conve-
nience, the extant literature on product line design suppresses the likely fixed
costs associated with offering each quality level, and assumes that the firm
offers all possible varieties in a quality continuum (i.e., infinitely many qual-
ity levels). Without a constraint on the number of its quality levels, the
firm’s quality choice is merely an outcome of consumers’ self-selection under
the optimal price policy. However, casual observations reveal that firms of-
ten can afford to offer only a limited number of quality varieties. In such a
case, how to locate these quality levels in the firm’s quality space becomes an
imperative question. We characterize the optimal location of these quality
levels, and show that none of them will be located in an anomalous quality
interval.
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One factor that may lead to nonconvexity in a firm’s unit cost function
is its installation of multiple distinct types of production technologies. For
a given technology, it might be true that the associated unit cost rises more
rapidly as product quality increases, and an increasing, convex cost function
effectively captures such decreasing returns in quality provision. Neverthe-
less, firms in many industries frequently employ multiple types of technology
to produce the same generic kind of goods. Examples include using digital
(analog) machines to make products with high (low) precision requirements,
using flexible systems (dedicated assembly lines) in settings requiring high
(low) degrees of customization, and using liquid crystal display (i.e., LCD)
and cathode ray tube (i.e., CRT) to build displays with high and low degrees
of steadiness and clarity, respectively. Based on a distinct engineering prin-
ciple, each type of technology has its own cost advantage within a certain
range of product performance parameters. Even though the cost function
associated with each individual technology may be convex, the combination
of multiple convex technologies may give an overall unit cost function that
is no longer convex over the entire quality domain.
The printer industry is another well known example for utilizing multiple
types of technology, such as ink-jet, laser, and dye sublimation. Currently,
ink-jet has the lowest cost and is most suitable for low-to-intermediate quali-
ties of black-and-white printing. Laser printers require higher unit costs than
ink-jet and are ideal for high-end black-and-white printing. Dye sublimation
is the most expensive but provides the best quality, especially for color or
photographic printing. Many printer manufacturers install all three types of
technology (plus possibly others) to meet the demand for various printing
qualities. The readers are referred to Sutton (1998) for additional historical
episodes of firms’ pursuing multiple "technological trajectories".
Our modeling framework is almost the same as Mussa and Rosen’s, except
that in our model the unit cost function may exhibit nonconvexity. To ease
exposition, we also assume that the distribution of consumer types satisfies
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a familiar hazard-rate condition so that "bunching" does not arise.
When the unit cost function is nonconvex, a direct analysis of both the
pricing and quality location problems will prove very complex. In this paper
we use a simple shortcut to tackle both problems. The crux throughout is
to regard the lower convex envelope of the true unit cost as a "virtual" unit
cost function, and to consider the hypothetical problem in which the firm
could produce according to this virtual unit cost function. Since this virtual
unit cost function is convex by construction, this hypothetical problem can
be readily solved via standard techniques, and its solution is then shown to
be optimal for the firm’s true problem as well.
Our present paper is related to two streams of literature: product line
design and vertical differentiation. Product line design by a monopolist is a
widely studied topic in economics (e.g., Mussa and Rosen 1978, Itoh 1983,
Maskin and Riley 1984, Gabszewicz et al 1986, Wilson 1993). A key con-
tribution of Mussa and Rosen (1978) is to realize the optimality of inducing
different consumers to purchase the same product (also called "bunching")
under certain conditions on the distribution of consumer types, and to devise
an "ironing" procedure to deal with bunching. Gabszewicz et al (1986) exam-
ine how a "natural" monopolist’s product line choice may critically depend
on the scope of the consumer income distribution. The natural monopolist
prices its product line in a manner that keeps out potential entry, and its
output is thus fixed. Much of the subsequent research effort down this line
has focused on higher dimensional spaces of product attributes and consumer
types (e.g., Matthews and Moore 1987, McAfee and McMillan 1988, Wilson
1993, Armstrong 1996, Sibley and Srinagesh 1997, and Rochet and Chone
1998).
The extant papers on product line design usually adopt specific forms of
unit cost functions and thus have not fully considered the role of production
in designing an optimal screening procedure. For example, the unit cost is
an increasing, strictly convex function of quality in Mussa and Rosen (1978)
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and Rochet and Chone (1998), and is zero for all qualities in Gabszewicz et
al (1986).
There also exist oligopoly models in the context of vertical differentia-
tion, e.g., Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982), Gal-Or
(1983), Moorthy (1985), De Fraja (1996), Johnson and Myatt (2003), and
Jing (2004). Here a paper more closely related to our current analysis is
Johnson and Myatt (2003), which examines how an incumbent firm adjusts
the structure of its product line in response to entry. In particular, they
identify respective conditions under which the incumbent will add a "fight-
ing brand" to intensify product competition and withdraw a brand too close
to the entrant’s to avoid head-on product competition.
Section 2 presents the model. Sections 3 derives the optimal price and
product policies when the firm does not face a variety constraint. In Section
4, we characterize the optimal location of a finite number of quality levels in
a continuous quality domain. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2 Model
In this market a monopolist firm provides a product at various quality levels.
The firm’s quality space is unidimensional and represented by an interval
Q = [0, b]. The marginal cost of providing a product of quality s is c(s),
and is independent of the amount produced at this or any other quality
level. There is no fixed cost. We assume that c is nonnegative and twice
continuously differentiable, except possibly at finitely many points. We also
assume, without essential loss of generality, that
c(0) = 0, c(b) < b. (1)
We now turn to the model of demand. There is a continuum of consumers,
indexed by the real variable θ, called the consumer’s type. Each individual
consumer either does not purchase the product, or purchases exactly one
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unit. If consumer θ purchases a product of quality s at price p(s), her net
utility is
U [s, p(s); θ] = θs− p(s). (2)
This is the familiar Mussa-Rosen utility function, where θ measures the con-
sumer’s marginal valuation of an additional unit of quality. Through proper
rescaling, (2) can accommodate the class of utility functions that are multi-
plicatively separable in consumer type and product quality. Given the price
function p, each consumer chooses a quality level that maximizes her util-
ity. In particular, the choice of quality zero generates zero utility, and thus
represents not purchasing this product. Assume that consumer type θ is dis-
tributed on the unit interval [0, 1] according to a strictly positive probability
density function f(θ). Let
J(θ) = θ − 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
,
where F (θ) =
R θ
0
f(x)dx. Assume that
J 0(θ) > 0, (3)
which is the familiar hazard-rate condition under which bunching does not
arise. This assumption also implies that J−1(·) exists and has a positive first
derivative.
3 Exogenous Quality Space
In this Section we assume that the monopolist does not face a variety con-
straint. The problem of the monopolist is to choose a subset of Q and a
price schedule to maximize its profit. In what follows, we shall use the so-
called "direct" approach (due to Wilson (1993)) that works with the price
schedule, as opposed to the indirect approach that deals with the quality as-
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signment. Once the optimal price policy is characterized, the firm’s quality
choice is then an immediate outcome of consumer self-selection. In the body
of the text, we only sketch the formulation of the firm’s problem and state
its solution. A precise and expanded treatment of this Section is given in the
Appendix.
The firm’s price policy is a real-valued function p on Q, which we assume
satisfies the following conditions:
p(s) ≥ 0 and is nondecreasing, (4)
p(0) = 0 and p(b) ≤ 1. (5)
Because each consumer’s utility is linear in quality, one can show that, with-
out loss of generality, we can limit our attention to price functions that are
convex (see the Appendix.)
Suppose, for the moment, that p is twice differentiable and its derivative
is nondecreasing. From the consumer utility function (2), the optimal quality
choice of consumer θ, σ(θ), is simply the solution of the first order condition
p0[σ(θ)] = θ, (6)
provided that
0 ≤ σ(θ) ≤ b and θσ(θ)− p[σ(θ)] > 0.
If the consumer is indifferent between multiple qualities, we make the con-
vention that she will choose the lowest such quality. Then since p0(s) is
nondecreasing,
σ(t) ≤ σ(θ) if and only if t = p0[σ(t)] ≤ p0[σ(θ)] = θ.
Hence, the mass of consumers who purchase a quality not exceeding s is
F (p0(s)), and the density of consumers who purchase quality s is f(p0(s))p00(s).
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Therefore, the price function p(s) yields the firm a profit
π(p) =
Z b
0
[p(s)− c(s)]f(p0(s))p00(s)ds. (7)
In fact, one cannot generally assume that the optimal price function will have
the nice properties we have just assumed for it. Essentially, one can only
require that the price function be sufficiently "regular" so that the profit is
well defined. A precise statement of the class of "admissible" price functions
is given in the Appendix.
Next, we only describe the firm’s optimal price policy; the detailed analy-
sis is relegated to the Appendix. Let w denote the largest convex function
that lies below the cost function c. Formally, let ª denote the set of all
convex functions ϕ on [0, b] such that
ϕ(s) ≤ c(s) for all s in [0, b],
and define w by
w(s) = max {ϕ(s)|ϕ ∈ ª} . (8)
We call w the lower convex envelope of c. One can show that w is convex
and nondecreasing, and that w(0) = 0. We call a quality level s extreme if
it is not contained in an open interval on which w is linear. We also call an
interval on which c(s) > w(s) anomalous. Note that by construction w(s)
is linear in an anomalous quality interval, and that at the extreme quality
levels, w(s) = c(s).
Theorem 1 The optimal price function is given by
p∗(s) =
Z s
0
J−1(w0(x))dx. (9)
Furthermore, demand is zero except at the extreme quality levels.
Because of the consumer utility function (2), by choosing a price function
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that is linear on a particular interval, the firm has effectively chosen not to
offer the quality levels in that interval. Clearly, the optimal price function is
linear where w(s) is linear. Theorem 1 thus implies that, when the unit cost
is not a convex function of quality, the monopolist will choose not to offer
one or more intervals of quality. This directly contrasts with the previously
known result that the quality choice of a monopolist with a strictly convex
cost function has no gaps (Mussa and Rosen 1978, and Rochet and Chone
1998).
When the consumer types are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], the monop-
olist’s optimal price schedule simply becomes
p∗(s) =
s+ w(s)
2
.
A second implication of Theorem 1 relates to technology utilization by a
firm employing multiple individually convex production technologies.
Corollary 2 Suppose the monopolist employs I production technologies, each
represented by a convex unit cost function ci on (0, b]. Then its optimal
quality choice is a collection of intervals such that on each interval, for
some technology i, ci(s) = w(s), where w is the lower convex envelope of
c(s) = min{ci(s), i = 1, ..., I}.
The proof is immediate from Theorem 1. According to this Corollary,
the firm should use technology i to produce those quality intervals where
ci(s) = w(s). A technology for which no such interval exists may be called
obsolescent. Note that, in our model a technology may become obsolescent
even if it still possesses a cost advantage over certain quality levels; this
happens for technology i if ci(s) > w(s) holds for all s.
Theorem 1 also implies a fairly general sufficient condition for price dis-
crimination to be suboptimal for the monopolist. When c(s) > w(s) on
(0, b), the monopolist’s quality choice degenerates to a singleton {b}, namely
the upper bound of the quality space. Alternatively, a corner solution is
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optimal as long as the cost function c(s) lies above the straight line connect-
ing (0, 0) and (b, c(b)) (Here the straight line is the lower convex envelope
w(s)), regardless of the curvature of c(s). This corresponds to the previous
results by Stokey (1979), Salant (1989), and Johnson and Myatt (2003). In
a intertemporal monopoly that can potentially discriminate on delivery time
(with a sooner delivery meaning a higher quality), Stokey (1979) shows that
under certain cost conditions the firm may choose only its earliest feasible
delivery date and thus does not invoke price discrimination. Also in settings
of vertical differentiation, Salant (1989) and Johnson and Myatt (2003) show
that the monopolist will sell only its highest feasible quality when there are
increasing returns to quality (i.e., when the unit cost function is sufficiently
flat).
4 Locating a Finite Number of Qualities
In Section 3, we have examined the monopolist’s quality choice when it does
not face a variety constraint. To benchmark with the extant literature, the
preceding analysis has ignored any likely fixed costs required for offering each
quality. When such fixed costs are taken into account, however, the firm can
only afford to offer a limited number of qualities, despite the fact that it
is technologically feasible to produce at any level in the quality continuum.
The following question then arises naturally : How should the firm locate
a finite number of qualities in the continuous quality space? The current
Section aims to answer this question.
The monopolist has to locate K (a finite number) distinct quality levels
labeled 0 < s1 < ... < sK in Q. We proceed in two stages. First, we
determine the optimal pricing policy for any K given quality levels.
10
4.1 Pricing a Finite Set of Qualities
Suppose for now that the quality levels s1, ..., sK are fixed. Without any con-
fusion, let ck denote the marginal cost at quality sk, c(sk). To ease exposition,
we introduce a zero-quality product s0 = 0, which costs the firm nothing to
produce, i.e., c0 = 0. Let s = hs0, s1, ..., sKi and c = hc0, c1, ..., cKi. Define
dk =
ck − ck−1
sk − sk−1
, 1 ≤ k ≤ K. (10)
These dk are the “slopes" of the cost vector. Since the unit cost function c(s)
need not be convex in our model, the cost vector c may be such that dk is
not nondecreasing in k.
The firm charges a price, pk, for each product of quality sk. We make
the convention that s0 is offered for free, i.e., p0 = 0. Given the price vector
p = hp0, p1, ..., pKi, each consumer chooses a quality level that maximizes her
net utility. Again, a consumer choosing s0 does not purchase.
Define
θk =
pk − pk−1
sk − sk−1
, 1 ≤ k ≤ K. (11)
The variables θk are the "slopes" of the price vector. Observe that each
product has a non-negative demand if and only if θk is nondecreasing in k.
Hence the price vector p is called admissible if
0 ≤ θ1 ≤ ... ≤ ...θK ≤ 1. (12)
For an admissible price vector p, the demand for each quality sk (1 ≤ k ≤ K)
is F (θk+1) − F (θk), where θK+1 = 1. The firm chooses an admissible price
vector p to maximize its profit:
Problem P. Max
p
πc(p) =
KX
1
(pk − ck)[F (θk+1)− F (θk)]. (13)
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In what follows, it will be useful to express (13) in terms of the variables
θk.
Lemma 3 The objective in Problem P is equivalent to
πc(p) =
KX
1
(sk − sk−1)(θk − dk) [1− F (θk)] . (14)
The proof of the Lemma is relegated to the Appendix. For a strictly
convex cost function, Itoh (1983) first used a profit formula similar to (14)
to analyze the impacts of adding a new product by the monopolist (repre-
senting finer market segmentation) on the prices of its existing products, and
consequently on consumer welfare.
If the "cost slopes" dk are non-decreasing in k, then maximizing (14)
pointwise will give the optimal "price slopes" θk that are also non-decreasing
in k, and thus the resulting price vector will be admissible. However, since
the unit cost function c(s) is nonconvex in our model, the cost vector c may
be such that dk are not non-decreasing in k. This means that maximizing
(14) pointwise does not yield an admissible solution in general.
To obtain an admissible price policy for Problem P, we next construct
and consider an alternative, virtual problem of the firm (Problem V), which
has an admissible solution. We then show that the solution to Problem V is
also optimal for Problem P.
Let H be the convex hull of the pairs (sk, ck), 0 ≤ k ≤ K, and let v be the
function whose graph is the lower boundary of H. Clearly, v(s0) = c0 and
v(sk) ≤ ck for k ≥ 1. In Problem V, the firm were able to produce according
to the hypothetical unit cost v(sk), instead of ck, and had to choose a price
vector p for the given quality vector s to maximize its profit:
Problem V. Max
p
πv(p) =
KX
1
(pk − v(sk))[F (θk+1)− F (θk)]. (15)
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Define
gk =
v(sk)− v(sk−1)
sk − sk−1
, 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
Note that gk is non-decreasing in k by construction of v. Using an argument
similar to Lemma 3, we rewrite (15) as
πv(p) =
KX
1
(sk − sk−1)(θk − gk) [1− F (θk)] . (16)
Maximizing (16) pointwise with respect to θk yields
θ∗k −
1− F (θ∗k)
f(θ∗k)
= gk, (17)
or equivalently
θ∗k = J
−1(gk), (18)
from which the optimal price vector for Problem V follows:
p∗k =
kX
1
J−1(gi)(si − si−1), 1 ≤ k ≤ K. (19)
Since J−1(·) is strictly increasing, θ∗k is non-decreasing in k, and therefore p∗k
is admissible.
From (17) and (18), we also have
£
J−1(gk)− gk
¤
f(J−1(gk)) = 1− F (J−1(gk)). (20)
We are now in a position to characterize the optimal price vector for s.
Theorem 4 p∗ is an optimal price vector for Problem P. In particular, the
demand for sk is positive only if gk < gk+1.
Proof: Denote π∗c and π
∗
v as the maximum profit attainable in Problems
P and V, respectively. First, π∗v ≥ π∗c . This is because, for any admissible
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price vector p, πv(p) ≥ πc(p) as ck ≥ v(sk) by construction of v.
Next, for any quality sk where gk = gk+1, we have θ
∗
k = θ
∗
k+1 under the
price vector p∗ (by (18)). Therefore, in Problem V the demand for such
quality levels is zero. That is, the demand for sk is positive only if gk < gk+1.
Note that gk < gk+1 implies ck = v(sk). Therefore the profit π∗v is also
attainable with the firm’s true cost vector c and price vector p∗. That is,
π∗v = π
∗
c .
This shows that p∗ solves the monopolist’s real problem, Problem P.
Q.E.D.
When gk is strictly increasing in k, we have ck = v(sk) for all k, and
thus dk must be strictly increasing in k. Therefore, Theorem 4 implies that
dk must be strictly increasing in k in any nondegenerate location of these K
quality levels (in the sense that each quality level attracts positive demand
under optimal pricing.)
In essence, this Subsection is the discrete analogue of Section 3. Compar-
ing Theorems 1 and 4, we see that the optimal price policies have the same
spirit for both continuous and discrete quality sets.
4.2 Quality Location
We now turn to the firm’s problem of locating s inQ. By Theorem 4, plugging
p∗ ((19)) into Problem P gives the firm’s profit as a function of s:
Problem P0: Max
s
Πc(s) =
KX
1
(p∗k(s)− c(sk))[F (J−1(gk+1))− F (J−1(gk))].
(21)
To solve Problem P0, we first consider the hypothetical quality location
problem (Problem V0) in which the firm could produce according to the vir-
tual cost function w(s), the lower convex envelope of c(s). Let H 0 denote the
convex hull of the pairs (sk, w(sk)), 0 ≤ k ≤ K, and let v be the function
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whose graph is the lower boundary of H 0. Since w(s) is convex by construc-
tion, we have v(sk) = w(sk) for all k.
Define
hk =
w(sk)− w(sk−1)
sk − sk−1
, 1 ≤ k ≤ K. (22)
Therefore, if the firm were to produce according to the virtual cost func-
tion w(s), then the optimal price for each quality sk would simply be
p0k(s) =
kX
1
J−1(hi)(si − si−1), 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
(cf. (19)), and Problem V0 may be formulated as
Problem V0: Max
s
Πw(s) =
KX
1
(p0k(s)−w(sk))[F (J−1(hk+1))−F (J−1(hk))],
(23)
or equivalently (by an argument analogous to Lemma 3):
Max
s
Πw(s) =
KX
1
(sk − sk−1)(J−1(hk)− hk)
£
1− F (J−1(hk))
¤
. (24)
The following equation would also hold valid (cf. (20)):
£
J−1(hk)− hk
¤
f(J−1(hk)) = 1− F (J−1(hk)). (25)
This entity plays a critical role in the subsequent analysis.
As we have seen in Section 3, absent the variety constraint, the firm will
not sell a quality level in an anomalous interval. The next Theorem shows
that this result remains valid when the firm can offer only K quality levels
in the quality domain.
Theorem 5 An optimal interior solution s∗ for Problem P0 is characterized
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by: for 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
[1− F (θ∗k)]θ∗k − [1− F (θ∗k+1)]θ∗k+1 = [F (θ∗k+1)− F (θ∗k)]w0(s∗k), (26)
and
θ∗K = w
0(s∗K), (27)
where θ∗k = J
−1(hk). Furthermore, each s∗k must be an extreme quality.
Proof: We first show that s∗ as characterized in (26) and (27) is an optimal
interior solution to Problem V0, and then show that it is also optimal for
Problem P0.
Differentiating (24) with respect to sk and cancelling terms with (25), we
have, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
∂Πw(s)
∂sk
= [1− F (J−1(hk))][J−1(hk)− w0(sk)]
+[1− F (J−1(hk+1))][w0(sk)− J−1(hk+1)] (28)
and
∂Πw(s)
∂sK
= [1− F (J−1(hK))][J−1(hK)− w0(sK)]. (29)
Since Πw(s) is continuous, an optimal solution to Problem V0, s∗, always
exists. The characterization of an interior solution s∗ (as given in (26) and
(27)) follows from rearranging the first order conditions ((28) and (29)). In
fact, it has the following property.
Lemma 6 In the optimal solution to Problem V0, no quality level is in an
open interval where w is linear.
The proof of the Lemma is given in the Appendix.
Denote Π∗c and Π
∗
w as the maximum profits attainable in Problems P
0 and
V0, respectively. We have Π∗w ≥ Π∗c . This is because, for any given quality
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vector s and a corresponding price vector p, producing with w yields a profit
at least as large as producing with c does (cf. (13)), because w(s) ≤ c(s) by
construction.
Recall that w is linear in an anomalous interval (where c(s) > w(s)). By
Lemma 6, at each s∗k we must have c(s
∗
k) = w(s
∗
k). This implies Π
∗
w = Π
∗
c .
Therefore, the solution to Problem V0, s∗, must also be optimal for Problem
P0. The second statement of the Theorem follows directly from Lemma 6.
Q.E.D.
Since the demand for a product of quality s∗k is F (θ
∗
k+1)−F (θ∗k), the RHS
of (26) above represents the marginal costs due to an additional increment in
s∗k. The first term on the LHS ([1−F (θ∗k)]θ∗k) is the increase in revenue from
consumers purchasing a quality equal to or above sk, due to an additional
increment in sk. An increment in sk would also make it more attractive
to the original purchasers of sk+1,..., sK , and thus compete away sales and
reduce the revenue from these qualities above sk. The second term on the
LHS captures such a revenue reduction, and reflects the spirit of "upstream
interference" as first pointed out by Mussa and Rosen (1978). Equation (26)
thus equates the marginal revenue from quality sk to its marginal cost, and
(27) has a similar interpretation.
Theorem 5 has only considered the case of an interior solution (0 < s∗K <
b). Since the function J(·) is defined on [0, 1], J−1(·) is bounded between 0
and 1. An interior solution obtains when w0(b−) ≥ 1. To see this, simply
note that ∂Πw(s)∂sK |SK=b ≤ 0 when w0(b−) ≥ 1.
Note that, s∗K may also occur at the corner (i.e., s
∗
K = b). A sufficient
condition for s∗K = b is w
0(b−) < 1 and J−1(w(s)/s) − w0(s) > 0 on (0, b].
When w0(b−) < 1, we always have hK < 1 = J(1) or J−1(hK) < 1, which
implies 1 − F (J−1(hK)) > 0. When J−1(w(s)/s) − w0(s) > 0 on (0, b], we
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have
J−1(hK) = J
−1
µ
w(sK)− w(sK−1)
sK − sK−1
¶
> J−1
µ
w(sK)
sK
¶
> w0(sK).
We therefore have ∂Πw(s)∂sK > 0 on (0, b], which implies s
∗
K = b must hold.
As an example, when consumer types are uniformly distributed on [0, 1],
(26) and (27) simply reduce to
w0(sk) =
1
2
(hk+1 + hk), k < K,
and
w0(sK) =
1
2
(1 + hK),
respectively.
From the proof of Theorem 5, the problem of locating K qualities for
a nonconvex cost function c(s) (Problem P0) is equivalent to locating K
qualities for its lower convex envelope (Problem V0).
Another property of the quality location problem is its supermodularity.
Theorem 7 Πw(s) in Problem V0 is a supermodular function.
Proof: We only need to show that the cross partial derivatives of Πw(s)
w.r.t. qualities are nonnegative (Topkis 1978): For k < K,
∂2Πw(s)
∂sk∂sk+1
= −f(J−1(hk+1))(J−1(hk+1))0
∂hk+1
∂sk+1
[w0(sk)− J−1(hk+1)]
−[1− F (J−1(hk+1))](J−1(hk+1))0
∂hk+1
∂sk+1
= f(J−1(hk+1))(J
−1(hk+1))
0∂hk+1
∂sk+1
[hk+1 − w0(sk)]
> 0,
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where the second equality is derived after collecting terms with (25), and the
inequality is due to ∂hk+1/∂sk+1 > 0 and hk+1 > w0(sk).
For |k − j| > 1, we have
∂2Πw(s)
∂sk∂sj
= 0.
Q.E.D.
An implication of Theorem 7 is that a local cost reduction around quality
sk may lead to an upward adjustment not only to sk, but also to the remaining
quality levels.
5 Conclusion
This paper has extended the theory of product line design along two direc-
tions: a nonconvex unit cost function and endogenous location of a finite
number of quality levels. To the best of our knowledge, these two directions
are still underexplored in the extant literature. When the monopolist does
not face a variety constraint, its quality choice consists only of those "ex-
treme" quality levels (i.e., quality levels where the lower convex envelope of
the unit cost function is nonlinear.) Thus, there are gaps in its product line.
This result also has implications for: (1) utilization of multiple individually
convex technologies; and (2) conditions under which price discrimination is
suboptimal (i.e., when the monopolist should "bunch" all participating con-
sumers to a single quality level.)
Another contribution of this paper is characterizing how the monopolist
should position a finite number (K) of products in the quality space, since
most firms in reality will face such a variety constraint. We see that the op-
timal locations of these K products are again "extreme" qualities. The fol-
lowing two types of quality region are therefore excluded: (1) the anomalous
intervals where the unit cost lies strictly above its lower convex envelope; and
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(2) those quality intervals where the unit cost function is linear. Note that
this result does not follow directly from the pricing policy. Recall that the
pricing policy (Theorem 4) only entails that the slopes of the cost trajectory
formed by the K qualities are strictly increasing. One could still obtain a
cost trajectory with increasing slopes even with one or more qualities located
in the anomalous intervals.
We conclude by discussing certain assumptions in the model. Our Section
3 uses the assumption that the cost function is twice differentiable except at
(at most) finitely many points. This assumption facilitates exposition but
does not appear essential. In fact, the analysis in Section 3 holds for cost
functions with kinks or jumps, including step functions.
A limitation is that our results are confined subject to the class of utility
functions that are multiplicatively separable in quality and consumer type.
It would be useful to extend the current analysis to more general classes of
utility functions. However, such an extension would undoubtedly be much
more complex. Largely for the same reason, a vast majority of the literature
on screening and vertical differentiation has also focused on multiplicatively
separable utilities.
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6 Appendix
A1. Expanded Treatment of Section 3: Exogenous Quality Space
Here we complete the description of the firm’s problem in Section 3, and
give the details of the analysis. First, we assume that the price function, p, is
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nonnegative and Lebesgue measurable on the interval [0, b]. Given the utility
functions (2) of the consumers, there is no loss of generality in assuming that
p is monotone nondecreasing, and
p(0) = 0, p(b) ≤ 1. (30)
Furthermore, since the utility functions are linear in the quality level s, the
firm can restrict its price functions to be convex. [To see this, let Lp denote
the lower convex envelope of p; then if p(s) > Lp(s), no consumer type will
demand quality s.]
The following standard proposition about convex functions will be useful
(see, e.g., Royden, 1988, Prop. 17, pp. 113-114).
Proposition 8 If p is convex on [0, b], then it is absolutely continuous. Its
right-and left-hand derivatives exist at each point, and are equal to each other
except possibly on a countable set. The left- and right-hand derivatives are
monotone nondecreasing functions, and at each point the left-hand derivative
is less than or equal to the right-hand derivative.
In view of the Proposition, we shall make the convention that the deriv-
ative of the price function, which we shall denote by G, is its right-hand
derivative, and so it is continuous from the right. With this convention,
p(s) =
Z s
0
G(t)dt. (31)
We next characterize the measure of the consumers who purchase a qual-
ity not exceeding s. For the moment, fix a convex price function, say p, and
let G denote its derivative. Since p is convex, the net utility of consumer θ is
concave as a function of quality s, and the right-hand derivative of her net
utility function at s is
θ −G(s).
21
There are three cases to consider. First, suppose that there is an interior s∗
such that G(s∗−) ≤ θ ≤ G(s∗) and s∗ is the minimum of such values. Then
the consumer will purchase s∗, provided
θs∗ − p(s∗) > 0.
Second, if θ ≤ G(0), then the consumer will purchase quality level 0. Finally,
if G(b−) ≤ θ ≤ 1, then the consumer will purchase quality level b, provided
θb− p(b) > 0.
In this case, the mass of consumers purchasing quality level b is 1−G(b−).
A price function p is called admissible if it satisfies
p(0) = 0, G(0) ≥ 0, G(b) = 1, and (32)
G(s) is nondecreasing in s. (33)
The assumption that G(b) = 1 is only a convention, since it does not affect
the price function, but with this convention the mass of consumers purchasing
quality level b is equal to G(b)−G(b−).
It now follows that, since θ is distributed on [0, 1] according to c.d.f. F ,
for an admissible price function the measure of the set of consumers who
purchase a quality level not exceeding s is equal to F (G(s)). Therefore, the
firm’s profit is
πc(p(s)) =
Z b
0
[p(s)− c(s)]dF (G(s)). (34)
[Cf. equation (7) of Section 3.]
We assume here that the unit cost function, c, is nonnegative and con-
tinuous. We also assume, without essential loss of generality, that
c(0) = 0, c(b) < b.
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Observe that these assumptions are weaker than those made in Section 3.
As in Section 3, let w denote the lower convex envelope of c. Let H denote
the set of points (s, y) that lie above the graph of w, i.e.,
H = {(s, y)|0 ≤ s ≤ b and y ≥ w(s)}. (35)
Note that H is a closed convex set. Recall that an extreme point of H is
a point in H that is not a nondegenerate convex combination of two other
distinct points of H. The following two facts about extreme points of H will
be useful, and are stated without proof.
Lemma 9 The pair (s, w(s)) is an extreme point of H if and only if there
exist no s0, s00 such that s0 < s < s00 and h is linear on [s0, s00]. Furthermore,
if (s, w(s)) is an extreme point of H, then w(s) = c(s).
Referring to the terminology of Section 3, the preceding lemma implies
that a quality level s is extreme if and only if (s, w(s)) is an extreme point
of H.
Define π∗c to be the maximum profit the firm can obtain with the cost
function c. Analogously, let π∗w be the maximum profit the firm could obtain
if its cost function were w. Since we have not yet shown that these maxima
exist, to be precise we define
π∗c = sup{π(p)|p is admissible and the cost function is c}, (36)
π∗w = sup{π(p)|p is admissible and the cost function is w}. (37)
Since w ≤ c, it follows that
π∗w ≥ π∗c . (38)
We shall now show that π∗w = π
∗
c . Let πw(p) denote the firm’s profit if its
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price function were p and its cost function were w. Thus
πw(p) =
Z b
0
[p(s)− w(s)]dF (G(s))
. =
Z b
0
p(s)dF (G(s))−
Z b
0
w(s)dF (G(s)).
Since w is convex and increasing, the Proposition is applicable; let its deriv-
ative be denoted by w0. Since G is right-continuous and F is continuous,
F (G(·)) is also right-continuous. Integrating by parts,
πw(p) = p(b)F (G(b))− p(0)F (G(0))−
Z b
0
F (G(s))p0(s)ds
−w(b)F (G(b)) + w(0)F (G(0)) +
Z b
0
F (G(s))w0(s)ds.
For the validity of the formula for integration by parts in this context, see
Rudin (1964). However,
p0 = G.
p(b)− w(b) =
Z b
0
[G(s)− w0(s)]ds
p(0) = w(0) = 0,
G(b) = 1.
Hence, after making the appropriate substitutions and collecting terms, we
arrive at:
Lemma 10
πw(p) =
Z b
0
[G(s)− w0(s)][1− F (G(s))]ds. (39)
Maximizing the right-hand side of (39) pointwise with respect to G(s),
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we get
G∗(s)− 1− F (G
∗(s))
f(G∗(s))
= w0(s),
or equivalently
G∗(s) = J−1(w0(s)). (40)
Integrating the last gives the price function
p∗(s) =
Z s
0
J−1(w0(x))dx, (41)
which is optimal for the cost functionw. (Note that to determine the constant
of integration we have used the condition that p(0) = 0.)
Now recall that w is linear in any anomalous interval, and hence so is p∗.
Hence demand is zero except where (s, w(s)) is extreme. Furthermore, at
any extreme point, w(s) = c(s), and so
π∗w = πw(p
∗) = πc(p
∗) ≤ π∗c .
But we previously showed that π∗w ≥ π∗c [cf. (38)], and so
π∗w = π
∗
c . (42)
We thus have shown that p∗(s) as given in (41) is also optimal for the cost
function c, proving the first statement of Theorem 1. The second statement
of Theorem 1 is obvious considering the consumer utility function (2).
A2. Proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 3.
πc(p) =
KX
1
(sk − sk−1)(θk − dk) [1− F (θk)] .
Proof : Let
xk = pk − ck.
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With this notation, (13) becomes
π(p) =
KX
1
xk[F (θk+1)− F (θk)],
where θK+1 = 1. Rearranging terms, one has
KX
1
xk[F (θk+1)− F (θk)] = −
KX
1
(xk − xk−1)F (θk) + xK.
(This is an analogue of integration by parts for finite sums.) Hence
π(p) = −
KX
1
(xk − xk−1)F (θk) + pK − cK .
Observe that
xk − xk−1 = (sk − sk−1)(θk − dk),
pK − cK =
KX
1
(sk − sk−1)(θk − dk).
These, together with the preceding equation for the profit, lead immediately
to the conclusion of the lemma. Q.E.D.
A3. Proof of Lemma 6.
Proof: We prove this Lemma by showing that Πw(s) is convex in sk in
any open interval where w is linear. Differentiating (28) with respect to sk
and simplifying with (25), we see that for 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, when w00(sk) = 0,
∂2Πw(s)
∂s2k
= (J−1(hk))
0∂hk
∂sk
f(J−1(hk))[w
0(sk)− hk]
+(J−1(hk+1))
0∂hk+1
∂sk
f(J−1(hk+1))[hk+1 − w0(sk)].
We can readily verify the following: ∂hk/∂sk > 0, ∂hk+1/∂sk > 0, w0(sk) ≥
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hk, and w0(sk) ≤ hk+1. From these, it is clear that ∂2Πw(s)/∂s2k ≥ 0 wherever
w00(sk) = 0. Similarly, it can be verified that, wherever w00(sK) = 0,
∂2Πw(s)
∂s2K
= (J−1(hK))
0∂hK
∂sK
f(J−1(hK))[w
0(sK)− hK ] ≥ 0.
This indicates that, in Problem V0 the firm would never locate any quality
in an open interval where w is linear. Q.E.D.
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